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AMERICAN INDIAN LAW:
A DISCOURSE ON CHTHONIC LAW
GREGORY GAGNON*

ABSTRACT
This discourse on Chthonic Law, a theory propounded by H. Patrick
Glenn among others, is the occasion for describing advantages and
disadvantages of the introduction of customary American Indian law
(Chthonic law) into the courtroom. Remarks on the theory, considerations
of its merits and weaknesses and illustrations from American Indian
societies lead to the conclusion that Chthonic law should become part of the
admissible evidence in American courts. A major criticism of Chthonic
Law theory is that it tends to describe a fictionalized version of society.
Examples of American Indian violence, use of punishment, and private
property law counter the idyllic construction of Chthonic law. Examples of
the actual operation of a different legal system do exist, particularly the use
of compensation and the justice goal of restoration after offenses. Chthonic
law theory, if modified can be of use to American Indian plaintiffs.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Comparative government scholars generated a model of indigenous
justice called Chthonic law.1
This model, describing the general
characteristics of indigenous law, was created to facilitate comparisons with
other legal systems, and perhaps, to assist empowering legitimization of
customary law within both domestic and international courts. Historically,
nation state legal systems like the United States typically exclude
customary or tribal law from the court room. In addition to Chthonic law,
comparative law theorists also identify Talmudic, Civil, Islamic, Common
law, Hindu, and Asian as world legal traditions.
It is a cliché that the twenty-first century is one of overlapping
magisteria2 operating within different legal paradigms. Courts, domestic
and international, are constantly faced with situations where they must
adjudicate across legal traditions. If Chthonic law is allowed, this could
alter domestic arrangements about land, jurisdiction, self-government, and
ultimately, sovereignty within many nation states.
II. IMPOSING STATE LAW ON INDIGENOUS SOCIETIES
Colonialism left pockets of indigenous populations within nation
states.3 The United States, Australia, New Zealand, Ghana, South Africa
1. This paper is based on a guest lecture given to Professor Gregory Gordon’s Comparative
Law class at the University of North Dakota School of Law. The editors of the North Dakota Law
Review kindly indicated that the lecture might be of interest to a wider audience. My lecture
focused on Chthonic law as a constructed model used to consider indigenous legal systems. I
asserted that Chthonic law, as described in the literature, is really a variation of the Noble Savage
Environmentalist dating back to Montesquieu and Rousseau. Under the prodding of editors, the
lecture has been modified a bit and a panoply of citations added to enhance the original
presentation. Their labors are appreciated. This essay remains essentially a lecture that is a
discourse on aspects of the Chthonic Law theory, its flaws and its applicability today, rather than a
standard law article. I hope that it will generate interest in American Indian Law as well as
thoughts about legal fictions, inter-cultural law, and model credibility among readers.
2. A magisterium is an authoritative domain of truth. Stephen Jay Gould posited that religion
and science, for instance, are non-overlapping magisteria. In this usage, Chthonic societies have
magisteria different from nation-state foundational magisteria, and therefore reconciling both
magisteria in judicial proceedings is profoundly problematic.
3. Chthonic is an awkward term as are so many theoretical constructs, but it is the term
created for comparative law. Chthonic implies primeval, created by the original societies, and
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and many others still have separate, identifiable Chthonic, or aboriginal,
societies which have legal status within the larger nation states. During the
past several decades, indigenous peoples living within nation states have
challenged the existing status quo based in part on Chthonic law.4
As many former colonies became nation states, indigenous peoples
within these emergent nations, like the United States, continuously
struggled for self-determination and world recognition within their
respective dominant nation states. After indigenous societies were
incorporated into the new nation states, their only recourse for recognition
of their claims for justice required them to use the courts of their
conquerors. Most nation states gradually came to recognize separate
existence and rights for indigenous peoples within the general rubric of the
principles of national self-determination.
Today, the United Nations provides a forum for indigenous
organizations and their advocates.5 It offers an arena where surviving
indigenous societies can assert their rights even where they are not
recognized or are severely compromised by the nation states within which
they exist. However, redress still must be obtained through the legal and
legislative systems of the nation states.
As nation states, like the United States, have matured, their legal
systems responded to cases brought by the indigenous peoples, but only
within their national legal systems. Indigenous peoples have argued that
Chthonic law must be considered to achieve real justice. The Catch 22 is
that Chthonic peoples have had to turn to nation state courts to gain redress
for losses incurred by being colonized.6 Indigenous peoples and their issues
are stipulated as domestic law by international agreement.

founded on religious worldviews; therefore, it is ancient and precedes the legal systems created by
nation states or post-tribal societies. Chthonic peoples have been incorporated into the nation
states that were constructed from European empires in the Americas, Asia, and Africa. Some
nation states, like China, also have significant indigenous or Chthonic populations. Chthonic
societies are those based on worldviews functionally conceived of as indigenous polities that
existed prior to being absorbed within nation states. Examples include American Indians, Ainu,
tribal societies within various African states, the Maori, Native Hawaiians, and Aborigines within
Australia. To a large degree, Chthonic law is synonymous with customary law, traditional law,
and indigenous law. The terms are used interchangeably in this essay.
4. A representative study of assertions of indigenous societies is James (Sa ke’j) Youngblood
Henderson, Indigenous Diplomacy and the Rights of Peoples: Achieving UN Recognition (2008).
5. See infra note 7.
6. H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 58 (3d ed. 2007). The Chthonic
population of the world is estimated at about 260 million (4-5% of world population). Id. at 2.
Roughly 80% are in Asia, 7% in South America, 6% in North America, 4% in Africa, 3% in
Australia/Oceania, and .01% in northern Europe (Saami people). Id. The designation of
Chthonic, natives/aborigines/indigenous in common usage, is arbitrary. People of European
descent have been present in many areas of the world for several hundred years. Japan has been
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A. CHTHONIC LAW FORUMS
After decades of effort seeking a public platform to feature Chthonic
claims, the United Nations has declared that Chthonic peoples exist and
have rights. According to Article 26 of the United Nations Declaration of
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, “[i]ndigenous peoples have the Right to
own, use, develop and control the lands, territories, and resources that they
possess by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or
use as well as those they have otherwise acquired.”7 For instance,
indigenous plaintiffs claim that their oral histories could help define
traditional ownership and rights of usage.
Significantly, many nation states that incorporate indigenous peoples
had already created a legal status for them as distinct political-legal entities
and often as distinct racial or ethnic groups within the sovereign jurisdiction
of the nation states. Generally, these states have trended toward recognition
of distinct rights for “their” Chthonic peoples. However, they have not
necessarily embraced Chthonic Law as admissible in their courts. In effect,
indigenous peoples have to conform to state law and legislation to describe
themselves and their legal traditions without the benefit of being able to
draw on centuries of Chthonic Law.
The United States Code of Federal Regulations (hereinafter
“C.F.R. 25”) describes its relationship with American Indians.8 Canada’s
1982 Constitution Act reaffirmed aboriginal and treaty rights for Indians,
Inuits, and Metis, and designated them as aboriginal peoples.9 Australia
and New Zealand have acknowledged that the Chthonic peoples within
their boundaries have rights and separate status.10
The rub is in the details. How is justice determined for peoples who
had or have a different paradigm from the nation state about such things as
sovereignty, land use, payment, obligations, responses to criminal behavior,
or commerce? What about the interaction on the same soil between citizens
of the Chthonic peoples and those of the nation state? Whose law should be
used and how should those two systems be reconciled?
“colonized” for millennia, but the Ainu minority is Chthonic and China has many distinct
minorities/indigenous peoples.
7. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/61/295, art. 26(2) (Sept. 13, 2007).
8. “The term ‘Indian tribe’ means any Indian tribe, band, nation or other organized group or
community of Indians (including any Alaska Native village or regional or village corporation)
which is recognized as eligible for special programs and services provided by the United States to
Indians because of their status as Indians.” 25 U.S.C. § 2403(3) (2006).
9. Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.) (Can.).
10. Australia and New Zealand have extensive legislative, judicial, and executive histories of
the acceptance of unique indigenous status for the Aborigines and Maori respectively.
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The several dominant nation states involved have decided that their
courts will determine the rules for indigenous peoples and state relations.11
Indigenous peoples have come to the courts of their conquerors for redress,
but they have insisted, with some success, that their traditions, histories, and
legal traditions be included in considerations of the relationships. However,
in order to be acceptable to nation state courts, the principles of law for
Chthonic peoples must be understood by the arbiters.
Construction of the Chthonic law model is the result of efforts to
comprehend indigenous worldviews, and therefore, indigenous laws. As
Professor H. Patrick Glenn points out in his tour de force, Legal Traditions
of the World, Chthonic law emanates from the indigenous cultures of the
world from a people that “live in or in close harmony with the earth.”12
Christine Zuni Cruz quotes from Glenn in describing Chthonic peoples
“who live ecological laws . . . by living in close harmony with the earth.”13
Several scholars have examined Chthonic law among indigenous peoples in
Africa, Asia, and the Americas and some even harken back to when
Europeans practiced Chthonic law.14
In the model utilized by H. Patrick Glenn, Chthonic law describes the
worldview of indigenous peoples. He indicates that this worldview
includes a sense of rootedness in nature, tradition, and a commitment to
maintaining balance and harmony.15 Chthonic law orders societies that are
peaceful, harmonious, and non-violent. Disputes do occur, but they are
handled through the application of consensus decision making that applies
traditional rules.
For example, although disputes concerning land use and land
ownership occur in indigenous societies, these disputes are easily resolved
because of the symbiotic relationship that exists between the two concepts.
Land is held in common and used according to need in these societies so
there is no argument about ownership, and arrangements for use can be
modified according to societal needs. Glenn asserts that Chthonic people

11. STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES (4th ed. 2012); THOMAS
ISAAC. ABORIGINAL LAW: COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS (2012).
12. GLENN, supra note 6, at 60.
13. Id. at 330.
14. See, e.g., T. W. BENNETT, A SOURCEBOOK OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW FOR
SOUTHERN AFRICA (1991).
15. Variations on the concept of peace and harmony in Chthonic societies are ubiquitous and
include Voltaire, Montesquieu, Locke, and Marx. Pat Sekaquaptewa, Key Concepts in Finding,
Definition and Consideration of Custom Law in Tribal Lawmaking, 32:2 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 390;
SHARON RIDGEWAY & PETER J. JACQUES, THE POWER OF THE TALKING STICK. (2014)
(demonstrates scholarship that assumes the Balance and Harmony model). SHEPHARD KRECH III,
THE ECOLOGICAL INDIAN: MYTH AND HISTORY (2000) (provides a convincing anecdote to the
model).
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accept the world of harmony and conform to decisions based on this
worldview.16 As an oral law, discussions among humans lead to justice.17
American Indians18 have insisted their traditional legal systems were
diametrically opposite many of the western legal traditions. Failure to
recognize this truth, Indians contend, prevents just adjudication of their
claims in nation state courts. American Indian justice focused on
restoration of a society—not on punishment. Their emphasis was
collective, not an individual versus the state model of justice. Consensus
derived from tradition was the indigenous norm.19
Most students of North American indigenous societies echo the
constructed view of Chthonic law as one of harmony and balance: a justice
system without coercion and punishment. This view of Chthonic law is not
only trumpeted by scholars, but by most other American Indians as well. A
common elaboration of this Chthonic model voiced by Indians and nonIndians even describes American Indians as the first ecologists.
There are several problems with this theory of Chthonic law being
accepted by courts as if it really existed from time immemorial the way
some would have it. The theory assumes that Chthonic peoples did not
have human foibles involving conflict and punishment, nor was there
internal violence within nations. Chthonic peoples are pictured as having a
single immutable worldview that did not change until the arrival of the
Europeans. Further, the model crystallizes all Chthonic societies into a
single worldview whether they are African, Asian, Oceanic, Australian,
South American, or North American.
If this idealized model of Chthonic Law is offered by Indian plaintiffs,
the opposite of the intended effect can result. It is easily refuted with
historical evidence. When the other side introduces evidence of imperfect
Chthonic societies, it undermines the legitimacy of indigenous law and its
traditional uses in reducing conflict and creating just solutions derived from
traditional indigenous worldviews. On the other hand, if objective
characteristic of indigenous societies and Chthonic law is introduced, then it
can have positive effects for indigenous peoples.

16. See generally GLENN, supra note 6.
17. Generalizations about models can be as selective as any summary of what are sometimes
complex, nuanced models as any other characterization of positions taken. However, this
summary is faithful to the model as presented by Glenn and others.
18. American Indian, Indian, Native American, Indigenous, First Nations, and Natives are
each a term applied to the descendants of indigenous North American and South American
populations. In United States law, the term used most often is Indian or American Indian.
19. James Zion and Robert Yazzie, Indigenous Law in North America in the Wake of the
Conquest, 55 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 55, 55-84 (1997).
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Although Chthonic law theory is really a variation on the Noble Savage
stereotype,20 if modified from that presented by Glenn, it can help obtain
justice for indigenous peoples. Naturally, the model has been embraced by
contemporary indigenous peoples because it places them in a superior
moral position to the nation states that rule them and establishes a premise
that can sway not only the larger society but its courts as well. Chthonic
theory provides a basis for efforts to increase the sovereignty of Chthonic
peoples and to improve their collective well-being.21 If one accepts the
Chthonic model, then efforts like those of the United Nations, on behalf of
indigenous peoples, make sense.22 The model may also help nation state
jurists to understand indigenous laws as they can be included in decisions
based on blending Chthonic law and nation state law systems.
If indigenous peoples want to litigate, they have a basis for arguing that
their laws and traditions are co-equal with the laws of nation states and need
to be considered in seeking redress. Even if Chthonic peoples must accept
the irresistible power of the nation states, they can argue for the admission
of Chthonic law in the courts of the conquerors as appropriate means to
their ends. Assuming that North American Indians had a similar
worldview, there remain key questions of exploring the interworking’s of
indigenous laws and their applications. For example, how did indigenous
law, such as Chthonic law, actually work? Is the idyllic view of this law
accurate? If the principles of Chthonic law are accepted, how can culturally
ignorant judges respond with the specificity necessary to nation state law?
What decisions of Chthonic law can be documented to the satisfaction of
principles of nation state evidence requirements? These key questions
illustrate how difficult blending differing law traditions can be. The
difficulty of answering them should not prevent applying principles and
making decisions within nation state legal systems.
The Supreme Court has evolved canons of construction for treaties:
“Ambiguities . . . must be resolved in favor of the Indians . . . [treaties]
must be interpreted as the Indians would have understood them . . . [and]
must be liberally construed in favor of the Indians.”23

20. Noble Savage Definition, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA.COM, available at
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/416988/noble-savage (last visited June 4, 2013).
21. See H. Patrick Glenn & Raymond D. Austin, American Indian Customary Law in the
Modern Courts of American Indian Nations, 9:2 WYO. L. REV. 351-373 (2011).
22. The United Nations efforts on behalf of indigenous peoples are discussed above and are
embodied in the Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. See JACKIE HARTLEY, ET AL.,
REALIZING THE UN DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: TRIUMUPH, HOPE,
AND UN RECOGNITION (2010).
23. STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 35 (1983).
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If the understanding of Indians is a key component, then there is at
least a narrow opening for the introduction of Chthonic/customary law in
American courts. Clearly, law must be derived from evidence in both
printed and oral history. In order to gain an understanding of how
indigenous justice systems actually worked on a daily basis, one must turn
to the historical records. Unfortunately, the recorded functioning of a
consensus justice system on a daily basis is tantalizingly sketchy. However,
we do know that America Indian societies combined tradition with everevolving consensus decisions to deal with issues. Punishment was not a
preferred means to deal with offenders.24
We also know land was not considered individual private property, and
national boundaries were not as they came to be in western societies before
they were imposed on the rest of the world. Tribally known “territories”
were only loosely bounded, and use was not exclusive to a particular Indian
nation. We also know that extended kinship networks guided by tradition
dealt with most issues that would wind up in court today. For instance,
division of property, indemnification, and criminal actions did not have to
be judged by legal institutions, but rather by kinship groups relying on
traditions.25
Much debate surrounds the constructed models of Chthonic or
traditional law as described by indigenous and comparative law scholars.
Often these scholars sketch a picture of an idealized world that would warm
the cockles of Karl Marx’s heart.26 Critics contend that this utopian world
never existed and its myths cannot be considered as facts. Some jurists
argue that Chthonic law cannot be discovered, and even if it could, it should
not be part of modern judicial proceedings.27 They insist that customary
law does not meet the rules of evidence necessary to justice.

24. H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD (2d ed., 2004). Nearly any
ethnography or study of traditional American Indian societies describes the use of alternatives to
punishment. The knowledge of this practice rises to the level of common knowledge. One might
also look at JOHN PHILLIP REID, A LAW OF BLOOD: THE PRIMITIVE LAW OF THE CHEROKEE
NATION (1970).
25. Numerous ethnographies and histories describe many of the American Indian nations.
See DAVID E. WILKINS & HEIDI KIIWETINGEPINESIIK STARK, AMERICAN INDIAN POLITICS AND
THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM (3d. ed., 2011) (offering a general description of tribal
governments); CHARLES M. HUDSON, CONVERSATIONS WITH THE HIGH PRIEST OF COOSA (2003)
(providing an idealized synthesis ethnography for Southeastern U.S. Indians).
26. This characterization is not entirely fair to the well-constructed models and research of
many scholars. As with Glenn, only the most naïve do not qualify their statements about societies
in peace and harmony with acknowledgement that the traditional did change and that there was
conflict. However, there is a decided de-emphasis on conflict and a marked emphasis on
idealizing traditional, “Chthonic” societies.
27. JAMES W. ZION, SEARCHING FOR INDIGENOUS COMMON LAW IN INDIGENOUS LAW AND
THE STATE, 121-148 (1988).
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I argue that there is ample evidence for discovering Chthonic law and
omitting it from courts is disingenuous. On the other hand, traditional
American Indian societies did not live in a world of balance and harmony
even if to do so was the goal. Those who see an idealized traditional world
hurt their case by leaving themselves open to scholars, like Shepard Kretch,
who point out just how violent tribal societies could be. Violence was very
common.28 The “harmonious” North American Chthonic world was violent
long before the arrival of the Europeans, and it grew more so after their
arrival.
War is a feature of many tribal oral histories. The Iroquois
Confederation’s origin tradition describes the extreme violence that led the
cultural heroes, Hiawatha and Deganawidah, to create the Iroquouis League
with its rules eliminating intra-confederation warfare.29 Historically, war
among Indian nations was just as common and constant as it was between
the various countries throughout Europe. American Indian cities and towns
were often fortified long before Europeans arrived.30 In fact, being a
citizen-soldier, or a warrior in common parlance, was almost a requirement
for manhood and was a source of prestige for eons.
Wars were fought for the usual reasons: territory, resources, revenge,
and many times, glory. Wars led to exchanges of territory and changes in
tribal boundaries. Sometimes, defeated tribes were forced to pay tribute to
the victors. Indian tribes had clear protocols for land ownership and control
of resources, and they were willing to fight to improve their conditions at
the expense of other tribes. Diplomacy was much valued, and alliances
between and against other tribes was common. When Europeans arrived,
Indian leaders sought to use them as allies against their nation’s enemies.31

28. The examples cited concerning violence within American Indian societies are common
knowledge among historians and have received emphasis in scholarship since at least the 1970s.
See generally RICHARD WHITE, THE MIDDLE GROUND (1991); DANIEL RICHTER, FACING EAST
FROM INDIAN COUNTRY (2001); COLIN CALLOWAY, ONE VAST WINTER COUNT (2003);
SHEPARD KRECH III, THE ECOLOGICAL INDIAN (1999); PEKKA HAMALAINEN, THE COMANCHE
EMPIRE (2008); JOHN REID, A LAW OF BLOOD (1970).
29. FRANCIS JENNINGS, THE AMBIGUOUS IROQUOIS EMPIRE: THE COVENANT CHAIN
CONFEDERATION OF INDIAN TRIBES WITH ENGLISH COLONIES (1990). Any work on the origins
of the League of Peace or the Iroquois Confederation will describe the oral tradition of the
violence and any history of colonial America, New France, and the Huron will detail the violence
of Indian wars. Another perspective is BERNARD BAILYN, THE BARBAROUS YEARS: THE
PEOPLING OF BRITISH NORTH AMERICA: THE CONFLICT OF CIVILIZATIONS (2012); see also
PEKKA HAMLAINEN, THE COMANCHE EMPIRE (2009).
30. Mississippian chiefdoms (900-1700 A.D.) were often fortified, and when Europeans
arrived, they found Indian cities and towns surrounded by palisades and observed a near constant
warfare between Indian tribes.
31. MICHAEL RHOADES, LONG KNIVES AND THE LONGHOUSE: ANGLO-IROQUOIS POLITICS
AND THE EXPANSION OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA (2011).
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American Indian warfare did not have non-combatants, and because of
the weaponry, was graphically brutal. Torture or slavery for prisoners was
common. War involves outsiders and does not necessarily mean that
domestic Chthonic law was not one of determining balance and harmony in
an ideal world. However, there were also domestic, internal disputes that
can be documented, and their occurrence seems to be based on universal
human nature that deviants exist in each society. Indians are not exceptions
to this generalization.32
III. INTRA-SOCIETAL VIOLENCE AND PUNISHMENT AMONG
INDIGENOUS SOCIETIES
Unfortunately, for the confident use of the constructed Chthonic Law
model in courts, life was much more complex than the model describes. Not
only was war common, but domestic society among American Indian
nations was not always peaceful and harmonious. One example of intrasociety violence and punishment is the manner in which the indigenous
societies dealt with witchcraft. Most American Indian societies accepted
the reality of witchcraft and viewed it as a vehicle used by some to focus
evil against individual members of society.33 Although it was generally the
responsibility of the bewitched individual to draw on shamans to counter
such sorcery, the whole community was often called upon to respond. As a
result, witches were often punished with execution decided upon by a
consensus of the masses.34
Another example of intra-society violence and punishment within
indigenous societies is the manner in which justice was enforced. For
example, extended families, or clans in some tribes, were responsible for
meting out justice. The clan was responsible for its members and acted to
punish, as well as protect and sustain.35 For instance, if a husband beat his
wife, his wife’s clan or family could punish him if there were no other
means of recourse available.

32. GREGORY GAGNON, CULTURE AND CUSTOMS OF THE SIOUX (2012). This is one of
hundreds of scholarly descriptions of American Indian societies, including the many inter-tribal
wars and those involving Europeans and Americans. See also, ANTON TREUER, OJIBWE IN
MINNESOTA (2010) (describing the expansion of Ojibwe into northern Minnesota through warfare
that displaced Dakota).
33. See generally WHITE, supra note 28.
34. One of the many recorded instances of killing witches occurred during the efforts of
Tenskwatawa (the Shawnee Prophet) to recruit adherents to his Nativist vision. He simply
accused opponents of witchcraft and urged their execution. Navajo retaliations for witchcraft are
well documented in numerous ethnographies.
35. See generally HUDSON, supra note 25.
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Deeds that endangered the whole community were often punished by
military-police societies.36 These societies, common to most tribes,
enforced the understood laws with various punishments including
whipping, destroying the offender’s property, and other penalties. Such
sanctions were imposed by the community council or even by the selected
leader.
In order to deal with cases of homicide, most tribal societies followed
the tradition of blood revenge.37 According to this tradition, it was the
family’s responsibility to kill someone from the offender’s family in
retribution. Most societies mitigated this responsibility with the practice of
“covering the dead” through negotiated compensatory payments. The
offender’s family could offer compensation and the victim’s family was
encouraged by tradition and community leaders to accept it. Sometimes,
adoption of a replacement was the compensation. In the end, the family had
the right to respond to homicide with violence, but the community worked
to develop an alternative that restored the community.
Most American Indian societies made every effort to mitigate intracommunity violence.38 For example, Cherokees maintained sanctuaries for
offenders while the families negotiated alternative solutions. Most
southeastern tribes declared an annual amnesty for offenders as part of their
renewal ceremonies. Those exiled for various offenses could return to the
community in good standing. Some, like the Comanches,39 demanded that
individuals were responsible for retribution—their legal system has been
characterized as “violent individualism.”40
Another community response to violence was to simply wait until the
malefactor was punished by supernatural Beings who were offended by the
individual. For instance, a sorcerer could be punished by another sorcerer,
or a disrespectful hunter could be punished by the animal’s spiritual being.
Thunderers and other spiritual Beings were viewed as being responsible for
wreaking vengeance on individuals. Indigenous justice combined human
and supernatural retribution even as it focused on restoration of community.
Banishment was an infrequent punishment in many American Indian
nations.41 On the surface, this is not much of a sanction. However, the
36. Examples of military societies are the Kit Fox Society of the Lakota, the Dog Soldiers of
the Cheyenne, and the Black Mouths of the Hidatsa. Membership was usually sponsored by an
established member and some belonged to several of the societies.
37. See generally REID, supra note 28; HUDSON, supra note 25.
38. See generally HUDSON, supra note 25.
39. See generally HAMALAINEN, supra note 28.
40. K. N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY, at ix (1941).
41. Patricia H. Kunesh, Banishment as Cultural Justice in Contemporary Tribal Systems, 37
N.M. L. REV. 85 (2007).
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worst thing that could happen to an Indian was to be alone. Someone who
was abandoned would not have the support of family—a support that was
material as well as psychological. Abandonment in indigenous societies
could be at least as punitive as solitary confinement in western societies.
The ideal for American Indian societies was for people to live in
balance and harmony through following the traditions of the people.
Forgiveness, not punishment, was the goal. Decisions were expected to be
made with the good of society and restoration in mind, but the ideal was not
exclusively present. North American Chthonic society had its violent face,
and punishment was not alien.
A. AMERICAN IMPOSED LAW AND PUNISHMENT
After the United States was created, it moved to incorporate American
Indians. The United States steadily extended its control of American Indian
nations and created federal Indian law. By 1890, all Indians were on
reservations subject to the American justice system with its emphasis on
adversarial and punitive justice. The current reservation system is the result
of a systematic American policy to control Indians while opening the
continent to American immigrants. American intrusion into individual
Indian lives created a clash between worldviews—between a nation state
and Chthonic societies. The same pattern occurred in Canada, particularly
after 1867.42
IV. AMERICAN INDIAN CHTHONIC LAW AND CONFLICTS WITH
THE UNITED STATES LEGAL SYSTEM
Inter-cultural difficulties concerning criminal justice are common. It is
not just a matter of establishing that both societies accept punishment for
offenders. Different worldviews pose difficulties. In American Indian law,
the most obvious conflict occurred when Americans would not accept the
idea of compensation as offered by family members to restore society after
a violation of laws. The Sioux Wars of the 1850s began over the issue of

42. American imperialism and relations with American Indian nations is a well-documented
narrative. After the American Revolution, the United States either fought or intimidated
American Indian tribes, with the result that the United States annexed Indian lands according to
American law, and often after punitive wars and invasion. The process left American Indians,
collectively, with about 120 million acres by 1890. Indian country was further reduced to about
forty million acres between 1890 and 1934. Today, over three hundred federally recognized
Indian governments (reservations) total about forty-five million acres, but the United States has
sovereign title leaving the tribes with aboriginal title. It is like usufruct ownership. Readers who
want to refresh their memories about the scope of American Indian policies, major court
interventions, and territorial expansion should consult PETER PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT
FATHER: THE UNITED STATES AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN (abr. ed. 1986).
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Indians who offered compensation, not punishment, over the theft of a cow
while Americans demanded punishment of the thief.43
Ex Parte Crow Dog,44 and the subsequent Major Crimes Act of 1885,45
are two examples of America’s rejection of Chthonic law. When Crow Dog
murdered Spotted Tail, Americans were so indignant about tribal use of
compensation rather than hanging that they seized and tried Crow Dog.46
Crow Dog was sentenced to hang by federal officials, but the ex parte
ruling on jurisdiction was that the United States had no jurisdiction in intratribal crimes, and Crow Dog was released. The United States reluctantly
accepted Chthonic law in this instance (at least in Indian on Indian crimes).
Congress ruled and the situation was “fixed” by legislation.
Congress passed the Major Crimes Act.47 Chthonic law was eliminated
by assigning jurisdiction for all felonies, even if committed by Indians
against Indians, to federal courts. The Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”)
was authorized to assume jurisdiction over other crimes, including the
violation of executive procedures through Courts of Indian Offenses set up
on each reservation.48 The Major Crimes Act completed what the Courts of
Indian Offenses started in 1883—the elimination of Chthonic law for
American Indians. An accompanying effect was that Indians being tried in
federal courts were not citizens, and there was no basis for including
Chthonic notions of law in proceedings conducted by Americans and
judged by Americans.
Indian agents directed the Courts of Indian Offenses on reservations,
even if the judges were prominent Indians appointed by the agents. If
Indian judges did not punish under the American style, their decisions were
overruled by the BIA.49 The main purpose of the BIA was to enforce the
law on Indian reservations. Because of the presence of the BIA, the
American style of punishment—whippings, denial of rations, chain gangs,
fines, and imprisonment—became the norm on Indian reservations as it was
in the larger society. Felonies were punished with the Draconian style of
the late nineteenth century. Hanging and long term incarceration were part
of American rule.50
43. DOREEN CHAKY, TERRIBLE JUSTICE: SIOUX CHIEFS AND U.S. SOLDIERS ON THE UPPER
MISSOURI 1854-1868 (2012).
44. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
45. Major Crimes Act, ch. 341 § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885) (current version at 18 U.S.C. §
1153 (2006)).
46. See generally PRUCHA, supra note 42.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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In response to the implementation of the American style of
punishment, a number of unintended, ironic consequences followed.
American Indians reacted to having their own legal systems erased by
turning to informal justice that operated as much as possible without using
the courts. Many American Indian communities maintained and reinforced
their cultural norms that included forgiveness and rough compensation
rather than formal adjudication. It might be argued that the apparent
lawlessness of contemporary Indian reservations is a legacy of the
imposition of American law.
American based courts were too foreign and were not seen as
legitimate options for dealing with malefactors. Today, antipathy toward
the structured criminal justice system continues, and the legacy of the
Major Crimes Act prevents development of a contemporary system that is
influenced by traditional Chthonic culture.
A. IT IS ALL ABOUT LAND
Another area where the historical record deviates from Chthonic theory
is in the area of land ownership and private property. Theorists, native and
non-native, insist that property was not a concept acceptable to American
Indians. The Chthonic model, as well as ethnographic studies, contends
that Indians had no private ownership. Land was held in common and
everyone protected the environment. It was sacred and had existed since
traditional times. Bewilderment was the dominant Native American
reaction to private property and land sales insisted upon by Americans and,
earlier, colonists.51 As with the issue of violence and punishment, the
actuality deviated from the Chthonic model.52
It is true that the sense of property among American Indian societies
varied significantly from that of the European and American societies, but it
is not true that they had no concept of ownership of land. Disputes about
boundaries of property occurred. On the national/tribal level, American
Indians knew where their boundaries were as was described in various
treaty negotiations. For instance, at the first Treaty of Fort Laramie, in

51. Hope M. Babcock, “[This] I Knew From My Grandfather:” The Battle for Admissibility
of Indigenous Oral History as Proof of Tribal Land Claims, 37 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 19 (20122013).
52. Abundant studies of American Indian property concepts exist. The classic study is
IRREDEEMABLE AMERICA; THE INDIANS’ ESTATE AND LAND CLAIM (Imre Sutton ed., 1985).
Other useful studies include ZUNI AND THE COURTS: A STRUGGLE FOR SOVEREIGN LAND
RIGHTS (E. Richard Hart ed., 1995), and William H. Rodgers Jr., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN
INDIAN COUNTRY (2005).

2013]

CHTHONIC LAW

43

1851,53 plains tribes were able to describe their own domains, even if there
were no boundaries protected by border guards and requiring passports for
foreigners. Protocols existed for individuals, groups, and even whole tribes
to enter one another’s lands.
Tribes often created and sustained neutral areas between nations. For
example, the famous hunting grounds of Kentucky, the less famous
Minnesota River Zone separating Chippewa from Dakota, and the area
along the Savannah River as far back as the 1540s were all areas that were
considered to be neutral among the various nations.54 Creating and
observing these zones required knowing land boundaries, as well as
effective negotiations of boundaries.
Another example of effective negotiation of boundaries occurred when
the Dakota Sioux Tribe allowed the Chippewa to expand their trade and
occupation into Dakota country in the seventeenth century through an
agreement that would be called a treaty today. Not only did the Sioux and
Chippewa accept the permanent nature of the population movement, but
other Indian nations did as well. It is significant that European and
American expansionists sought permission from tribes to occupy their lands
and bought permission with presents. In most treaties, boundaries were
described in terms Indians recognized as well as in map coordinates.
Chthonic law was recognized by both cultures once upon a time.55
Conflict over land use and on boundaries was really the result of
colonial immigrants and Americans refusing to accept joint use and
violating common practices. Insisting that hogs be allowed to run free,
insisting that Indians did not retain hunting rights on private farms, and
contempt for rights agreed upon were the problem. It is not so much the
case that non-Indians did not understand Indian usages, but that they
refused to consider them as valid. Indian efforts to get the colonials, and
later Americans, to observe Indian protocols were rarely successful.56

53. See generally PRUCHA, supra note 42. The purpose of the Fort Laramie treaty was for
the United States to gain a clear picture of which tribe had which boundaries for their nation.
Tribal testimony during the treaty negotiations indicates that leaders of each tribe could describe
the boundaries of their own tribe and of other tribes. The deliberations and treaty encompassed
nearly all of the northern plains tribes. The issue of how tribes used their own country in
interaction with other tribes was not addressed.
54. MARY LETHERT WINGERD, NORTH COUNTRY: THE MAKING OF MINNESOTA (2010);
ANTON TREUER, OJIBWE-DAKOTA RELATIONS: DIPLOMACY, WAR, AND SOCIAL UNION, 16791862 (1994).
55. See generally WHITE, supra note 28.
56. See CHARLES HUDSON, THE SOUTHEASTERN INDIANS (1976); BERNARD BAILYN, THE
BARBAROUS YEARS: THE PEOPLING OF BRITISH NORTH AMERICA-THE CONFLICT OF
CIVILIZATIONS, 1600-1675 (2013).
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It is noteworthy that those who introduced western law to the
indigenous people of North America did not choose to abide by and enforce
it on their own subjects. As European colonists and Americans grew in
power vis-à-vis Indians, they turned to their laws to dispossess native
peoples through exclusive reliance on European-American law. Chthonic
law was not admissible in the imperialists’ courts.57
Dispossession of Native peoples continued well into the twentieth
century with little or no acceptance of Chthonic law. Ironically, the door
was opened for the introduction of Chthonic law in the United States when
Congress terminated reservations and nearly abandoned the Trust Doctrine
in the 1950s. In order to redress legal issues, Congress created the Indian
Claims Commission to allow Indian tribes to assert claims against the
United States.58 Indian tribal plaintiffs were allowed to introduce the
testimony of anthropologists and other scholars in support of their case, and
were allowed to draw on customary oral histories. Since the late 1940s, the
introduction of Chthonic law has been possible.
Even earlier, in the 1930s as the Roosevelt Administration pursued new
approaches to the responsibilities of the federal government, Felix Cohen
developed synthesized federal Indian law to describe the relationship of
Indian nations to the United States.59 His work, combined with the 1934
Indian Reorganization Act, emphasized a restored validity for tribal
governments. Eventually, a canon of construction was accepted by federal
courts. The canon is described in various editions of Cohen’s Handbook of
Federal Indian Law.60
Currently, treaties are to be construed by courts in favor of Indians
when there are ambiguities. Treaties are to be interpreted according to how
the Indian participants understood the terms. This canon opened the way
for an application of Chthonic law in all cases involving treaties.
Unfortunately for Indians, the canon is often not honored in the breach.61
Contrary to the premise that Indians had no concept of private property
as described in Glenn’s Chthonic model, Indian societies traditionally
57. Several examples of the use of American law to dispossess includes the Doctrine of
Discovery as described in Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823), United States v. Sandoval,
231 U.S. 28 (1913), and Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1902). Each of these cases is
explicated well in LINDSAY ROBERTSON, GERALD TORRES, & ANGELA RILEY, INDIAN LAW
STORIES (Carole Goldberg et al. eds., 2011).
58. A very good description of the Termination period and the Trust Doctrine is in STEPHEN
L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIAN TRIBES, 29-44, 49-52 (1983).
59. See generally PRUCHA, supra note 42.
60. FELIX S. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (1982). Versions of this
handbook date back to 1941.
61. For appropriate, but not inclusive, examples see WALTER R. ECHO-HAWK, IN THE
COURTS OF THE CONQUEROR: THE 10 WORST INDIAN LAW CASES EVER DECIDED (2010).
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accepted the concept of private property within the context of their
respective worldviews. Men owned their personal effects—horses, later
cattle, hunting territories in some tribes, personal symbols, songs, and even
spiritual powers. Women owned their personal effects—often the home
and all that was in it, songs, spiritual powers, the use of land along with
their sisters as guided by elders, and designs for clothing and adornment.
Their peers knew and accepted this. Chthonic law did provide a means to
protect private property. Generosity, as a prime virtue, mitigated extremes
of private property in Indian societies but it did not eliminate the existence
of private property.62
My assumption is that scholars constructed Chthonic Law in response
to a need to legitimize the study of indigenous customary law for students
and colleagues who would be dealing with indigenous clients. Glenn
implies this in his comparative law text. Historically, nation state courts
refused to consider orally transmitted law as not meeting the rules of
evidence, so a means to be more inclusive led to the creation of the
Chthonic theory.
Generally, nation state courts still deny the validity of customary law,
but some cracks in the dam are visible. Probably, the impetus for
resurrecting Chthonic law as admissible in nation state courts is the
changing paradigm that includes legitimizing indigenous societies
throughout the world. The United Nation’s Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples is one indicator of this shift in international law.63
In part, Chthonic theory is founded on the sands of romantic ideas of
societies that lived in balance and harmony, based on relationships to the
environment and spiritualism, but legal systems abound with such legal
fictions. Perhaps it is a necessary term of art. Whether or not they were
ideal societies, Chthonic societies did exist. They did have different
worldviews from those of modern nation states. They did have laws, and if
indigenous societies continue to be accepted in national and international
laws, their legal histories need to be considered.
A potential Achilles heel for injecting Chthonic law lies in the model
itself, but it is surmountable with learning. Lawyers for indigenous clients
need to be aware that the Chthonic model can be easily challenged. Not
only is it hard to find precedents for its admissibility, but the ideal societies
living in peace and harmony really did not exist as described.
62. For one of many ethnographic examples of Chthonic law, see Theodore John Rivers, A
Study of the Laws of the Ottawa Indians as Preserved in the Ottawa First Book (1850), 42 KAN.
HIST. Q., 225 (1976).
63. REALIZING THE UN DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: TRIUMPH,
HOPE, ACTION (Jackie Hartley et al. eds., 2010).
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Acknowledging historical realities is required to strengthen legal
arguments.
Contemporary cases should take cognizance of the reality that
Chthonic law addresses issues of national boundaries, war, internal
violence, and private property. They should also describe Chthonic law
from a point of understanding that these societies dealt with less than
perfect circumstances. Deviance did exist and means for dealing with it
existed and are translatable to nation state legal systems.
Nation state courts need to explore how issues were adjudicated in
families, in councils, and in tradition. If Chthonic law is introduced in these
terms, then it can be a practical means toward justice for indigenous
plaintiffs rather than just a theoretical model used to compare different
modes of law.
A crucial question is: how Chthonic law can be injected into western
justice systems, particularly American federal and state courts?64 Perhaps
American laws of property are sufficient in most cases if they accept the
premise that Chthonic law should be admissible as common law specific to
cases involving corporation-like ownership. Perhaps provisions should be
made for current tribal courts to have jurisdiction in cases involving both
American and Chthonic issues. Once the principle that Chthonic law is
admissible is established, approaches will evolve. Another constructed, but
easily rebutted, component of the Chthonic law model is that indigenous
people followed “[a] system of law centered on the sacred nature of the
cosmos.”65 Professor Glenn, the renowned comparative law scholar,
indicates that Chthonic law is “in close harmony to the earth.”66
Those familiar with common Indian tropes would recognize the ideas
that the earth is sacred—as are all living things—and that American Indians
lived in perpetual harmony with their environments changing nothing,
taking only what they needed, and using every bit of each animal killed.
According to this asserted viewpoint, Indians protected the environment
through their harmonious relationship with the earth. Indians were green.
In fact, their entire cultures and behaviors anticipated the Green movement
of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

64. Although not explored for this article, private property that involves cultural patrimony
(e.g., ceremonial pipes, winter coats, beaded belts, ceremonial clothing identified with historic
individuals but that are also identified with a position) has been an issue in courts. This author has
seen tribal courts decide issues of cultural patrimony, including at least one case that reached an
appeals court. It is an interesting area open for exploration.
65. Chthonic Law Definition, WICTIONARY, http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/Chthonic_law (last
visited June 8, 2013).
66. GLENN, supra note 6, at 60-61.
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A problem is that this construction of American Indian
environmentalism is inaccurate. It is true that most Indian cultures
described all things as alive and sacred, but that did not mean they
maintained a pristine, primitive environment.67 Oral histories describe a
partnership agreement between tribal members, animals, and plants
regarding the rules of respect for one another. These agreements with fauna
and flora did not prevent Indians from modifying their environments, and in
some cases, wreaking havoc on it.68
Indians in the Southwest began using irrigation thousands of years ago,
and the land was degraded. Indian societies throughout eastern and
southern North America regularly burned forests and plains to enhance
growth and grazing for plants and animals valued as food, while destroying
habitat for others. With the arrival of Europeans and their eagerness to buy
furs, Indians chose to kill thousands of deer, beavers, and buffalo just for
their pelts.
In order to make profits, Indians sold both finished and primary
materials. Unfortunately, this meant that thousands of buffalo were killed
for their hides, and countless beavers and other fur-bearing animals were
trapped out of areas. As a part of Indian economies, horses, which
competed with buffalo and other animals of the plains for food, posed both
economic resources and environmental problems. Overgrazing led to more
environmental degradation. Birds were hunted solely for their feathers;
buffalo were killed for their tongues and used in ceremonies while the rest
of the animal rotted. Wars were fought for scarce resources. Extra corn,
beans, and squash were grown for commerce, and this taxed the land.
Of course, one could argue about degrees of destruction and altering
the environment. However, Indians were fully capable of altering
definitions for their needs and they did exploit their environments as they
were taught by their supernatural beings. Green Indians is an anachronism
culled from misunderstanding what sacred land and respect meant in
American Indian cultures.
Do these major flaws in Chthonic theory change the admissibility of
Chthonic law in contemporary courts? I argue that knowledge of what

67. The most extreme of the critics of the Indian as preserver of a pristine environment is
Shepard Krech III, Beyond the Ecological Indian in NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: PERSPECTIVES ON THE ECOLOGICAL INDIAN (Michael E. Harkin & David Rich
Lewis eds., 2007).
68. Shepard Krech’s work cited above summarizes much of the scholarship of Indian
relations with the environment. Although he might overemphasize the degradation attendant on
Indian actions, it is a matter of degree. Indian understandings of the agreement with living
creatures (flora, fauna, inanimate beings) is a topic that is beyond this article but worthy of
exploration.
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Chthonic societies really did and how they applied their laws offers greater
room for Chthonic laws and principles to be established in courts. Before I
hypothesize about the admission of Chthonic law, an aside is in order.
B. A NEW LEGAL RELATIONSHIP
American Indians have asserted their sovereignty in many ways for
decades. Since the 1970s, American Indian policy is to recognize a
government-to-government relationship between the United States and
tribal governments. The Self-Determination Policy, established in a 1970
President Richard Nixon speech and referred to in legislation, has created
tribal government flexibility.69 Because of this flexibility, tribes have
responded by assuming greater control of the institutions of government
and service, including courts. There is a new venue for using Chthonic law
and establishing precedents which can be transferred to federal and even
state courts.
Nearly all tribes have established tribal courts staffed according to
tribal regulations.70 They appear similar to state or federal court systems.
Criteria for the bench and for law practice are set by tribal government
regulations and some systems are quite complex. Tribal courts’ jurisdiction
includes civil and misdemeanor cases. Despite some reform in allowable
jurisdictions, tribal courts are restricted to Indians, and non-Indians are
excluded from tribal jurisdiction.71
Chthonic law, which includes traditional law and customs, is
admissible in most tribal courts. Some tribes have gone to the next level
and introduced what most designate as peace courts.72 The Navajo Nation
has the oldest (since 1982) and largest commitment to peace courts.73 To
the non-Indian, proceedings resemble mediation, but these proceedings
employ tribal traditions. Peace courts’ goal is the restoration of balance and
harmony in society. Tribes consider these courts an improvement because
Chthonic law is premised on repairing the community, not on punishing an
69. JUSTIN B. RICHLAND & SARAH DEER, INTRODUCTION TO TRIBAL LEGAL STUDIES (2d
ed. 2010).
70. CLARRIE E. GARROW & SARAH DEER, TRIBAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE (2004).
71. As always in Indian Country, there are a few exceptions. Non-Indians can accept tribal
jurisdiction by waiver. The 2013 Violence Against Women Act allows tribal jurisdiction over
non-Indians in domestic abuse situations, but these cases have yet to be tested in appeals, and the
full ramifications of this reform remain murky. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of
2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4 127, Stat. 54 (2013).
72. Tribes that have established Peace Courts include the governments of: Turtle Mountain
Chippewa, Navajo, Chickasaw, Shoshone, Arapaho, Grand Traverse Band, Seneca, Mississippi
Choctaw, and several Canadian reserves.
73. Robert Yazzie, Navajo Peacekeeping: Technology and Traditional Indian Law, 10 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 95, 95-102 (1997).
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offender. The jury is still out on the effectiveness of the peace courts as no
systematic effort to evaluate them has been completed.74
Even if nation state courts continue a discernible pattern of allowing
Chthonic law, problems remain. Perhaps the most significant challenge is
determining what Chthonic law is and how it applies in specific instances.
No one is alive who ever knew the operation of Chthonic law when it was
not subject to a colonial legal system. By its nature, Chthonic law is oral,
and it is case specific within an amorphous theory of law. There is no
specific response that can be routinely applied to a particular offense.
There is much doubt as to whether there are existing elders who know
enough of the ways of several generations ago to apply Chthonic law to
modern cases.
No tribe has had its own justice system free from American theories of
law and free from external influences that lend themselves to punishment
for at least seven generations.75 Contemporary tribal citizens and the court
systems they have crafted feature law codes, punishment of perpetrators,
forced compliance, and violence. Today’s tribal citizens are as likely to
demand punishment of miscreants as are citizens from the dominant
American state system. They have lived under an adversarial legal system
all of their lives and the lives of their parents and grandparents.
The existence of American style legal systems on reservations and the
restrictions imposed by American laws further limit the possibilities of
peace courts or Chthonic law usage. Even in peace courts where both
parties agree to participate, tribal government action is required to enforce
decisions. Criminal and civil proceedings are still in play if the peace court
fails. Tribal court actions must comply with federal standards in order to
allow for appeals from the tribal system to the federal court system.
Perhaps many of these points scored against peace courts associated
with Chthonic law are moot. Tribal governments are sovereign and if the
people want a court based on perceived Chthonic law, whether or not it is

74. Most published material so far has been more like descriptive advocacy. See generally
Robert Yazzie, Navajo Peacekeeping: Technology and Traditional Indian Law, 10 ST. THOMAS
L. REV. 95 (1997-98). Another descriptive article is James W. Zion & Robert Yazzie, Indigenous
Law in North America in the Wake of Conquest, 20 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 55 (1997).
Another article with a focus on abused women, particularly pertinent since passage of the
Violence Against Women Act which expanded tribal jurisdiction, is Donna Coker, Enhancing
Autonomy for Battered Women: Lessons From Navajo Peacemaking, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1 (19992000). The difficulty of reconciling recent trends in American courts and mediation are explored
in Phyllis E. Bernard, Community and Conscience: The Dynamic Challenge of Lawyers’ Ethics in
Tribal Peacemaking, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 821 (1996).
75. The last generation to have practiced indigenous law in its indigenous forms had to be
adults before 1883 when the Courts of Indian Offenses were established.

50

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 89:29

true Chthonic law, then they can create it. Legal fictions are important
because they can allow justice reform to proceed.
VI. REFLECTION
Chthonic law theory is seriously flawed by the standards of
historiography. It is truly legal fiction as constructed, but as with much
fiction, there are factual components floating around. These components
can be valuable tools for tribal cases in the courts of the conquerors and in
current tribal courts.
It seems that United States and Canadian courts have sometimes
accepted the introduction of evidence based on traditional Chthonic law.76
The principle of admissibility has been established. It is regrettable that
even if Chthonic law has been admissible is some courts, many judges and
lawyers remain dismissive of its applicability and legitimacy. At least the
door is open, and indigenous peoples may continue to step through for
justice.
One of the frustrations for practitioners of American style law is the
idea that Chthonic action (i.e., compensation or punishment) is determined
by the context of the offense, not by a specific punishment for a particular
offense.77 There is no automatic sentencing if one commits a particular
offense. Instead, the circumstances around the action are taken into account
before punishment is decided. Another frustration for those familiar with
adversarial law is that Chthonic law permits “judgment” by a consensus
reached by individuals not directly connected with the offense, the victim,
and the offender.
Perhaps the greatest impediment to the integration of Chthonic law
with nation state law is that the colonial states have too much invested in
the status quo. Imagine if Chthonic law actually provided justification for
negating land titles in British Columbia or South Dakota. The probability is
that res judicata will override efforts to overturn decisions that ignored or
refused to admit Chthonic law.
VII. CONCLUSION
Currently, United States Indians are wary of the courts, for good
reason. A series of decisions since the 1980s appear to have reversed the

76. See generally Babcock, supra note 51; see also Senator v. United States, No. CV-053105-RHW, 2010 WL 723792 (E.D. Wash.) (accepting Yakama traditional divorce and marriage
laws).
77. See generally RICHLAND, supra note 69.
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trend toward supporting tribal sovereignty.78 In Delgamuuk v. British
Columbia79 a Canadian court decisively supported Chthonic law, but British
Columbia is delaying compliance and still denies that there are any rights
for Indigenous people because Chthonic law is not real law. In the long
view, the Chthonic law model should bear good fruit for American Indians
as they pursue more accepted legitimacy in American and Canadian courts.
Courts of other nations have also accepted indigenous law. This reinforces
the possibility of a good future for its adoption.
The next task seems to be educating more lawyers about the Chthonic
model. Lawyers will then be able to accept the premise of Chthonic
legitimacy and see it count as much in evidence as facts from other sources.
Some of these lawyers may well become proficient in educating judges at
all levels and may then succeed them.
Ironically, Chthonic law, an oral narrative beholden to accumulated
tradition, needs to yield to the need to have it written down as precedent and
with rules of evidence that can be understood consistently. One wonders
how Chthonic law can work effectively when subject to the American style
adversarial approach. The theory needs to be modified to come closer to
what really happened in Chthonic societies.
Chthonic law seems to have the greatest possibility for use in courts
that are treating issues that affect different nations rather than individuals.
For instance, issues dealing with how boundaries existed and tribes were
treated can benefit claims between states, and tribal governments could lend
themselves to Chthonic law. It could even work with individual cases
involving non-Indians, but there are a great many obstacles. Regardless of
what it is called, Chthonic law needs to be admissible in American courts,
in front of judges who understand it.

78. Cases that have been pernicious in this sense are described by John P. LaVelle in Beating
A Path of Retreat from Treaty Rights and Tribal Sovereignty: The Story of U.S. v. Montana, in
INDIAN LAW STORIES 535-90 (Carole Goldberg et al. eds., 2011).
79. [1997] 3 S.C.R 1010 (Can.).

